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Israeli authorities will still be able to use military phone tracking surveillance
technology in the combat against the Coronavirus – but not in a way as unbridled
as the government had wished. This is the outcome of a recent decision by the
Israeli Supreme Court in the case of ACRI v. the Knesset. The Court refrained from
declaring the Law authorizing the General Secret Service to track contact persons
of infected COVID-19 patients invalid, but limited the cases in which military phone
tracking surveillance technology could be used, and required the government to
establish clear criteria for such use. 
The use of military surveillance technology as part of the arsenal of tools employed
in Israel in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic has been a contentious issue
almost since the beginning of the pandemic. This phone tracking technology,
referred to in Israel as “the Tool”, was developed in Israel and employed by the
General Secret Service (GSS) as a counter-terrorism tool. In March 2020, as the
number of confirmed COVID-19 patients began to grow, the government decided to
utilize the Tool for tracking those who have been in close contact with a COVID-19
positive patient, for the purpose of requiring them to isolate.
The legal basis
The legal basis for utilizing the Tool has changed throughout the pandemic. Initially,
the GSS was authorized to employ the Tool through emergency regulations, issued
under Article 39 of Basic Law: the Government. After the election of the 23rd
Knesset and the establishment of the Israel’s 35th government, the government
decided to authorize the GSS pursuant to Article 7(B)(6) of the General Security
Service Law, which determines that the GSS may perform “activities in any other
area determined by the Government, with the approval of the Knesset Service Affairs
Committee, which is designed to safeguard and promote State interests vital to the
national security of the State”. A petition against the authorization was filed at the
Supreme Court, which determined that Article 7(b)(6) can serve as a temporary
source of authorization, but that to the extent that the GSS is to continue to be
employed as part of the response to the pandemic, it must be authorized to do so
through primary legislation.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the Law was enacted, and entered into
force on July 21, 2020. The Law determines that subject to conditions of necessity
and to the lack of appropriate alternatives, and after considering the implications for
privacy, the government may authorize the GSS to assist the Ministry of Health in
conducting epidemiological investigations in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The authorization may be valid for renewable periods of up to 21 days, and allows
the GSS to process technological information about COVID-19 patients and the
individuals that were in contact with them in the 14 days prior to receiving a positive
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COVID-19 test answer. This includes information about location and contacts, and
the GSS may pass it to the Ministry of Health. Based on the information processed,
individuals may be required to enter a 14-day isolation period. The Law determines
that there will be a process of appealing a requirement to enter isolation. Individuals
are required to stay isolated until the decision in the appeal is received.
The Law was set to expire on January 23, 2021. However, on December 23, 2020,
the Israeli Knesset automatically dispersed following failure to pass a state budget.
Accordingly, Article 38 of Basic Law: the Knesset, which determines that “Any
enactment due to expire during the last two months of the term of office of the
outgoing Knesset or within four months after the Knesset has decided to dissolve
itself or during the first three months of the term of office of the incoming Knesset
shall continue in force until the expiration of the said three months” entered into
force. The Law was thus automatically extended.
The case
The petitioners against the Law argued that it violates the rights to privacy and
liberty, protected by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which is a constitutional
norm in Israel. They argued that the Law does not comply with the conditions of
Article 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (often referred to as “the Limitation
Clause”), which determines that “There shall be no violation of rights under this
Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for
a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required”. While the Law
was enacted for a proper purpose, they argued, it was grossly disproportional. The
petitions also argued that since the Law was enacted as a temporary order, the
automatic extension mechanism of Article 38 of Basic Law: the Knesset does not
apply to it, and that that the government’s continued authorization of the GSS did not
adequately take into consideration the conditions specified in the Law for authorizing
the GSS.
Of the three claims made in the petitions, the Court chose to focus on the third: the
manner in which the government exercised its authority under the Law. Thus, the
decision did not invalidate the Law, nor did it determine that it cannot be extended
pursuant to Article 38 of Basic Law: The Knesset (although the decision does
state that the fact that the Law was enacted as a temporary order is relevant for
determining the scope of governmental discretion). However, the Court determined
that the government’s decisions to authorize the GSS were neither reasonable nor
proportionate.
Chief Justice Hayut emphasized the lack of clear criteria for the authorization of the
GSS. The government’s continued authorizations, she stated, was over-sweeping,
and did not take into consideration developments and changes throughout the
pandemic. Specifically, the government did not take into consideration the expansion
of the epidemiological inquires mechanism, the possibility of providing an alternative
civic technological tracking tool, and the impact of the vaccination operation in
Israel. In light of this, she determined, the continued use of the GSS’s service was
subject to the establishment of a clear criteria for the conditions justifying such
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use, and in any case, could only be employed if a confirmed COVID-19 patient
refused to provide information regarding his contacts or whereabouts. Justices
Melzer, Barak-Erez, Amit and Baron agreed with Hayut’s conclusion, emphasizing a
number of additional important points. The first is the inaccuracy of the Tool, which
led to many people receiving mistaken messages requiring them to enter home-
isolation. Approximately 40 percent of the messages received were determined
upon examination to be unjustified, and attributed to the limitations of the Tool (for
example, individuals in different floors or apartments of the same building were
flagged as close contacts). The second is the lack of efforts by the government
to invest and develop alternatives.  Even Justice Solberg, who was of a minority
opinion, criticized the over-sweeping manner in which the government applied its
discretion.
Beyond Surveillance: Implications for Additional
Cases
The decision addresses the timely topic of privacy concerns associated with new
technologies, and naturally raises interest in this context. However, it also highlights
a number of other points that demonstrate the limitations of the law in the COVID-19
crisis. The first regards the importance of the insistence on primary legislation as
the necessary means for limiting rights. Such insistence has been a major issue
in Israel, and was presented as an important safeguard of rights in the COVID-19
crisis. In a blogpost published on this site, Aeyal Gross and Nir Costi question the
protective value of primary legislation that accords vast emergency powers to the
government. The picture unfolded in the decision regarding the manner government
decisions were made in practice substantiates their claims.
The second point demonstrated is the weakness, in practice, of the alleged
safeguards inserted into the Law.  For example, the temporality of the GSS’s
authorization was presented as a safeguard, but in reality, the authorization was
effectively renewed automatically by the government. In addition, the Law requires
the government to authorize the GSS only if there are no alternative means, and
to develop a civic technological alternative, but in practice, not enough effort was
invested in developing such alternatives. The availability of GSS surveillance
undermines the motivation to invest in other means.
The third point is the relevance of comparative review.  Justice Barak-Erez
emphasized that the Law and the sweeping, compulsory use of surveillance
technology over citizens is “exceptional” in a comparative perspective. However,
she also stated that the value of comparative analysis in a novel and ongoing
emergency situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic is limited. She explained that
countries may have different reasons for not employing surveillance, for example,
technological limitations, and in any case, the reality is changing in too fast a pace to
draw conclusions from a comparison made in a particular moment in time. 
The decision is a welcomed reminder that even in a pandemic, not all means should
be tolerated. However, it also paints a worrisome picture of the governmental
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decision making process during the pandemic, and highlights the importance of
judicial review in extreme situations.
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